I’ve extracted just the passages from this long article that specifically discuss the Kurds, because on their own they show an interesting contradiction. Downing assumes that a stable Turkey is a given. But from the Israeli point of view, the ‘balkanisation’ of Turkey, i.e. the loss of its Kurdish territories, would be welcome. Downing underestimates the durability of the tacit Israeli-Saudi alliance, which he calls “their cautious, initially puzzling, yet productive partnership.”
Apart from the fact that under the CIA umbrella Israel and the Sauds have participated side-by-side in various covert paramilitary operations for decades, all over the world but principally in the near east and north Africa, there is another factor to consider: this is the new global configuration which is emerging with China at the centre of it. It should never be forgotten that China and the Sauds, for different reasons, are both awash with US Treasury bills, which are objectively worthless – RB
Syriana redux: The Middle East fragments (extracts)
Brian M Downing, Asia Times, Feb 28 2012
The Kurdish people over the years have been the victims of regional powers and the pawns of various intelligence services. Events have given them the opportunity to create their own state; nature has given them the opportunity for a wealthy one. Following the First Gulf War in 1991, the US, UK, and France enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, which gave the Kurds the opportunity to govern themselves without fear of large-scale attacks from Saddam. The Second Gulf War shattered the Iraq government and the Kurds have all but seceded, establishing their own flag, constitution, and army. The Kurdish economy is booming and oil production is poised to grow nicely, especially if the Kurds break from from the revenue-sharing programs demanded by lower Iraq. Sectarian conflict inside Iraq and Syria may provide the opportunity to break away. Working arrangements with Turkey and Exxon Mobil may prove helpful here. Kurds serving in the Syrian army are refusing orders. Kurdish leaders are on guard as assassinations and assassination attempts have occurred, presumably on the orders of Syrian security forces. The Assad regime is increasingly desperate to hold onto control of the country, perhaps especially so in the Kurdish areas, which contain much of the country’s oil reserves and are contiguous to Kurdish Iraq.
Israel is motivated and positioned to aid in the creation of a greater Kurdistan. Israeli intelligence has had strategic ties with many Kurdish groups over the years. In the days of the Israeli-Iranian alliance, Israeli intelligence worked with Iranian Kurds to build ties with other Kurds in the region, especially those in two of Israel’s most powerful enemies: Syria and Iraq. By arming and training Kurds there, the Assads and Saddam had to allocate troops against them and Israel built valuable guerrilla allies across the region. Israeli-Iranian comity ended in the early 1990s, as Saddam Hussein’s army was badly damaged in the First Gulf War and Iranian power appeared unchecked and a potential danger. Israeli intelligence officers now work almost openly in northern Iraq and have turned their Kurdish assets against Tehran and perhaps also against Damascus. Saudi Arabia’s disposition toward Kurdish autonomy in Syria and Iraq isn’t as readily discernible. Syrian Kurds may be useful in undermining Shi’ite dominance and Iranian influence, but it might open up too much instability stemming from the prospect of a new oil-rich power to reckon with: one with long ties to Israel, whose alliance with Riyadh is unlikely to be enduring. Riyadh would of course welcome any difficulties the Kurds might inflict upon Iran, and support for greater Kurdistan in Syria and beyond might be an agreeable trade-off. Saudi Arabia would dearly love to see Israel and the US incite an insurgency in Iranian Kurdistan.
The Kurdish people, of course, dwell in several countries: Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. The uprising in Syria has been accompanied by demands from Syrian Kurds (some 8% of the 22 million Syrians) for greater “autonomy,” a term to the Kurdish people approximating “independence,” if not a code word for it. The rise of a Kurdish state from northern Iraq and possibly northeastern Syria will begin to solve the longstanding matter of their homeland, but it presents many problems for adjacent countries. Should Syrian Kurds unite with their Iraqi kin, alarm signals will ring out in Ankara and Tehran. It will be feared that Kurdish nationalism, awakened by rising power and booming oil exports, will set its eyes on Kurdish areas in Turkey and Iran. Greater Kurdistan will come at the expense of Turkish and Iranian territorial integrity. Turkey has mixed relations with the Kurdish region of Iraq, benefiting from construction contracts and oil transit fees but angered by Kurdish attacks inside Turkey. Ankara’s responses are irate denunciations followed by desultory air strikes that seek to send a message but not upset trade. Iran watches Kurdish Iraq with great interest as the area teems with foreign intelligence officers. Occasional Kurdish forays into Iran have met with Iranian responses, including ground incursions and artillery barrages. Despite the uncertainties ahead and the knowledge that even skillful plans can go awry, Israel stands to win from a reworked region. A dextrous Kurdish policy, and no small amount of good fortune, could bring a boon. Israel’s three most powerful enemies, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, could be broken into pieces, perhaps permanently.
