Here we are: look at it, by the same Gareth. It speaks for itself: linky – RB
The Classified ’28 Pages’: A Diversion From Real Pindo-Toad Issues
Gareth Porter, Middle East Eye (another CIA crock – RB), Apr 27 2016
The controversy surrounding the infamous “28 pages” on the possible connection of the Toads with the terrorists that were excised from the joint Congressional report on the 9/11 attacks is at fever pitch. But that controversy is a distraction from the real problems that the policies of the Toads pose to Pindostan and the entire Middle East region. The political pressure to release the 28 pages has been growing for the past couple of years, with resolutions from Congress critturs senior & junior urging the president to declassify the information. But now legislation with bipartisan sponsorship has advanced in Congress that would deprive any foreign government of sovereign immunity in regard to responsibility for a terrorist attack on Pindo soil and thus make it possible to sue the Toads in court for damages from the 9/11 attacks. That development prompted the Toad Foreign Minister (Adel al-Jubeir) to threaten last month to pull out as much as $750b in Toad assets held in Pindostan. The Obama administration opposes the legislation, warning of “unintended consequences.” Specifically, the Pindosi government could face lawsuits because of its actions abroad. Analysts of the economic policy of the Toads, however, do not take Jubeir’s threat very seriously, since it would simply punish the Toads’ own economy. Meanwhile, Obama said in a CBS Charlie Rose interview on Apr 16:
DNI Clapper is reviewing the 28 pages right now, to make sure that whatever it is that is released is not gonna compromise some major imperial interest of Pandosia, Empress of the Entire Universe, after all. Clapper is nearly finished, too. I mean, gee whiz.
But it is unlikely that the declassification of the redacted 28 pages would add any dramatic new revelation to the story of the Toads and the hijackers who carried out the 9/11 attacks. Former Senator Bob Graham, who was head of the Senate side of the joint intelligence committee, has implied that the 28 pages containing incriminating evidence about the hijackers’ links to the Toads. But Graham’s smoking gun is more likely to be speculative leads rather than real evidence of Toad support for the hijackers. Past suspicions of an official role played by the Toads in assisting the hijackers has focused on the two AQ operatives, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who moved to the San Diego area in early Feb 2000 and were immediately assisted by a man suspected in the San Diego area of working for the intelligence service of the Toads. What many have cited as even more suspicious is the fact that $130k in certified bank checks were sent to the wife of Omar al-Bayoumi, the suspected agent, by the wife of Bandar Bush, then the Toad Ambassador to Pindostan and more than a decade later, head of the intelligence service of the Toads. But even if those checks were a covert way of supporting an intelligence operative, the broader theory that Bayoumi’s job was to take care of the hijackers does not hold up in light of the information now available. Investigations by the FBI, the CIA and the two major public 9/11 bodies turned up no evidence that Bayoumi provided any financial support to the hijackers. On the contrary, they showed that Hazmi and Mihdhar were getting money when they needed it through a direct AQ channel.
The 9/11 Commission learned that the hijackers had left the apartment they had gotten through Bayoumi very soon after moving in, apparently because Bayoumi had organized a party in the apartment that was videotaped by one of the participants, and that the AQ operatives had seemingly not welcomed the attention. Very soon after that, moreover, Mihdhar actually left Pindostan and didn’t return until mid-2001. And in June 2000, Hazmi moved to Arizona, apparently through a network of contacts that AQ had established in Tucson in the 1990s. So Bayoumi did not play any role in the plans of Hazmi and Mihdhar, and the efforts to find any other evidence that the Toads were knowledgeable about bin Laden’s 9/11 plans have so far turned up nothing. It is unlikely that the leads related to suspicions of Toad involvement to be found in the 28 pages are completely different from those that have already been widely discussed in the media. Bayoumi’s relationship with Hazmi and Mihdhar has given rise to speculation about why the CIA failed to inform the FBI about the presence of Mihdhar in Pindostan until just two weeks before the 9/11 attacks. White House counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke was outraged that the CIA had known that an AQ terrorist was on his way to Pindostan and had kept him in the dark, even though he was supposed to receive every intelligence report on terrorism. He said in a 2009 interview (below) that the only reason he could think that the CIA kept the information to itself was that Cofer Black, the head of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, was determined to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar as CIA agents inside AQ. Clarke speculated that the CIA would have used the intelligence service of the Toads to approach the two AQ operatives and obviously assumed that Bayoumi was the Saudi agent who made the contact.
But more than a year had passed after the contact between the two AQ operatives and Bayoumi had been broken off before the CIA contacted the FBI and other agencies to request that Mihdhar be put on a watch list and began its own search for Mihdhar. That delay was obviously not the result of an effort to recruit Mihdhar and Hazmi. The truth is far more shocking. As the 9/11 Commission report makes clear, the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center had not even continued to focus on Mihdhar after first learning about his visa in Feb 2000. It had already lost track of him, and had moved on to other issues. Not until a review in Aug 2001 had revealed its oversight did the CTC do anything about Mihdhar, which is why the hijackers were not tracked down before 9/11. The Toads certainly played a role in the trail of events that led to 9/11, but there is no need to wait for the declassification of the 28 pages to understand that trail. It has long been well documented that the domestic socio-political constituency for bin Laden’s anti-Pindosi organization was so large and influential that the Toads themselves were forced to tread with extreme caution on AQ until the group’s attacks on the Toads themselves began in 2003. The Clinton administration had learned that supporters of bin Laden were being allowed to finance his operations through Toad-authorized charities. The regime systematically denied CIA requests for bin Laden’s birth certificate, passport and banks records. 9/11 Commission investigators learned that after bin Laden’s move from Sudan to Afghanistan in May 1996, a delegation of Toad boxtops had asked top Taliban leaders to tell bin Laden that (as long as) he didn’t attack the Toads, the 1994 termination of his Toad citizenship and freezing of his assets would be rescinded. The Pindo government has known that Toad financing of madrassas all over the world has been a major source of Jihadi activism. The Wahhabi perspective of the Toads on Shia Islam is the basis for their paranoid stance on the rest of the region, and the destabilization of Syria and Yemen. The 28 pages should be released, but at a time when the contradictions between Pindo & Toad interests are finally beginning to be openly acknowledged, the issue is just another diversion from the real debate on the Toads that is urgently needed.