Is This What’s in Those 28 Pages? And Does it Matter?
Peter Van Buren, We Meant Well (Blog), Apr 27 2016
Did the CIA meet with some of the 9/11 hijackers ahead of the attacks on New York? Did the Toads help finance those hijackers? Someone knows the answers, and soon, you might know as well. DNI Clapper told the NYT the so-called “28 pages,” a still-classified section from the official report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, may be released to the public as early as this summer. The full 838-page report, minus those pages, was published in Dec 2002. The pages detail Toad involvement in funding the 9/11 hijackers, and were classified by then-Pres Bush 43. So what do they say? Richard Clarke, once Pindostan’s National Security Coordinator, is best-known for trying to warn the Bush 43 administration that a terror attack was imminent in the days preceding 9/11. As late as Jul 5 2001, White House meeting with the FAA, the Coast Guard, the FBI, Secret Service and the INS, Clarke stated:
Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon.
Here’s what Clarke said at a security forum held this week in New York about what those 28 pages will reveal:
- 9/11 hijackers and Toad subjects (citizens is not the appropriate term – RB) (15 of the 19 hijackers were Toad subjects) Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq al-Hamzi met in San Diego with several other Toad subjects, including one who may have been an intelligence agent for the Toads, and another who was both an AQ sympathizer and an employee of the Toad Consulate in LA.
- The CIA also made contact with Midhar and Hamzi in San Diego, and unsuccessfully tried to recruit them. The CIA did not inform the FBI or others of this action until just before 9/11. In a 2009 interview, Clarke speculated (very stupidly – RB) that the CIA would have used the Toad intelligence service as an intermediary to approach the two.
- The 28 pages may include speculation that the Toad Ministry of Islamic Affairs funded mosques and other locations in Pindostan used by AQ as meeting places and for recruitment.
- The rumours that Toad charities and/or the spouse of then-Toad ambassador Bandar Bush (who went on to head the Toad Intelligence Agency from 2012 to 2014) directly funded the 9/11 hijackers per se are “overblown,” according to Clarke. However, elements of Toad charities and the ambassador himself did regularly provide funding to various Toad subjects in Pindostan, for example those needing money for medical care. It is possible that the 9/11 hijackers defrauded Toad sources to obtain funds, but less clear that any Toad government official knowingly funded persons for the purpose of committing 9/11.
Alongside Clapper, Clarke too believes the 28 pages will be released to the public within the next five to six weeks. Others have suggested more clear ties between the hijackers and the Toads, including multiple pre-9/11 phone calls between one of the hijackers’ handlers in San Diego and the Toad Embassy, and the transfer of some $130k from Bandar’s family checking account to yet another of the hijackers’ handlers in San Diego who was a Toad subject. Should the full 28 pages be released, there will no doubt be enormous emphasis placed on what they say, specifically the degree to which they implicate (the Toads themselves or their minions) in funding or supporting the 9/11 hijackers. If the CIA contact with some of the hijackers is confirmed, that will be explosive. But as pointed out in Oliver Stone’s movie JFK (below), after the what is the why, and that answer has the potential to affect the future, not just document the past.
Why were the pages classified in the first place? Who benefited? Why did they stay classified now into a second administration, some 15 years after the events they discuss took place? Why did Pindostan allow the Toad Ministry of Islamic Affairs to work in Pindostan under diplomatic status? That Ministry’s existence goes back to the 1991 Gulf War. The presence of Pindo troops was a shattering event in the imaginary history of Toad Hall, calling into question the bargain between the Toads and the Wahhabi clerics whose blessing allows them to rule. In 1992, a group of the country’s most prominent religious leaders threatened a clerical coup. The royal family, shaken by the threat, accommodated most of their demands, giving them more control over society. One of their directives called for the creation of the Toad Ministry of Islamic Affairs, which would be given offices in Toad embassies and consulates. Philip Shenon quotes John Lehman, the former Sec Navy and a 9/11 commissioner:
It was well-known in intelligence circles that the Islamic affairs office functioned as the ‘fifth column’ of the Toads in support of Muslim extremists.
Only one official in the Toad Ministry of Islamic Affairs inside Pindostan, Fahad al-Thumairy, was stripped of his diplomatic visa and deported because of suspected ties to terrorists. That was in 2002. Why does Pindostan still allow allow officials of the Toad Ministry of Islamic Affairs to work in Pindostan under diplomatic status? Why did the Pindo government not arrest Omar al-Bayoumi, a Toad subject and employee of the Toad aviation services company Dallah Avco. Although he drew a salary, according to the New Yorker, he apparently never did any actual work for the company during the seven years he spent in Pindostan. Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the Toad Embassy and with the consulate in LA. He was widely considered in the Arab expat community to be a spy for the Toads, though they denied that he was. Why did the CIA not reveal its contacts with the two 9/11 hijackers? Who benefited?