El Murid, Oct 9 2016
The failure of all of yesterday’s UNSCRs on Syria raises the question: what next? The crisis remains unsolvable, no agreement between system players is expected. The expectation of an intensification of the conflict there, of course, rests with the decisions taken by Pindostan. There are some substantial reasons to believe that the Pindosis may take the offensive, and in any case, the probability the Pindo coalition attacking Assad is extremely high, higher than ever for all five years of this war. On the other hand, many things in current Pindosi politics are determined by election on Nov 8. Yesterday’s polls, according to which Clinton is ahead of Trump by 5%, tend to reduce the likelihood of attacks, (because) if the desired result (Clinton’s election – RB) can be achieved without the strong drug which the explosion of patriotism no doubt is, then it is better to do so.
From a practical perspective for Assad, the assault on Aleppo is no less in its consequences than a large-scale strike on his army with cruise missiles by the Pindosis. To undertake the occupation of a fortified city in which there are about 6,000 to 8,000 fighters, shielded by civilians, is extremely costly in all respects. The political and especially the military advantage of the capture of Aleppo, bringing it under the control of government forces, is compensated by the severe disadvantage of (the cost of) such a victory. Actually, the Russian UNSCR just proposed to support the de Mistura plan, according to which the militants were given free passage for exit from Aleppo, which of course would have been perfect for Assad, so perfect that there were no chances of that resolution passing. For the West, the storming of Aleppo will be a celebration of life which will largely decide the outcome of this war. If Assad is able to take the city, it will (cost him) thousands of his own soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians. (He will have to) knock out the remains of his own and foreign forces, and he will eventually become a bloody butcher. If he fails to take the city, and judging by the pace of progress, the question may well be put this way, then he still runs out of reserves, and he will kill a bunch of civilians. Profit for the West is present in both cases.
The second objective of Pindostan is to demonstrate the impotence of Russia, and here the Kremlin is playing for the Pindosi team in full growth. Pindostan does not even need to do anything, all is done by the Russian partners. What is required is demonstrated. For objective reasons, the Russian operation in Syria is directly contrary to any canons of the military (art), the most important of which is the maximum concentration of forces and limiting their extension. Neither one nor the other can we do, by definition. First, Syria is far away and almost at the limit of our full supply, which is why we have to keep just one aviation regiment in Syria and assign to it just one land brigade, which in addition has long since disappeared, even the company and platoon commanders having been ordered across Syria. This regiment loudly proclaimed as brigade, does not change aircraft from this no more. In the war, which involved about half a million people, the regiment is a drop in the ocean.
Second, the lack of political objectives has a catastrophic impact on military planning. Initially, the Russian government said that the Russian military assistance had arrived to support the Syrian ground offensive. Duma International Committee head Pushkov last fall definitely called the time: three or four months, then let’s go home. It is unlikely that he was expressing his personal opinion; rather, it was voiced this installation. However, the collapse of the Assad put an end to all hopes, (and led to our) direct involvement in the war, each time suffering losses. In the beginning (Russia) was the hardest hit with downed aircraft, which unexpectedly brought Russo-Turkish relations to a new low and almost buried the project of Turk Stream (gas – RB), then we had to land ground forces, contrary to all the solemn statements by Putin that we will not under any circumstances conduct a ground operation. Now we have to take Aleppo, and our officers have openly appear in photos with brothers-in-arms (mainly Iranians, the Syrians being already almost gone).
There is a third circumstance which does not allow (Russia) to get involved in the Syrian adventure with all our (customary) youthful swing: Ukraine. Bringing its Ukrainian policy to its logical result, the Kremlin received an extremely hostile Ukraine, armed to the teeth and with no chance of survival but war, and with a multiple terrorist threat along half of its Western border. Immediately one recalls the promotional videos of 2014, which denounced the warmongers and asked: “Are you trying to draw Russia into a war with NATO?” Now in Syria the war is already on the threshold, but videos concerning that are not visible. Apparently, because the addressee of this question is the Russian President. And he will involve us in a war with NATO, and in anything else, just so that (he can remain) at his post until death. His and ours. To remove (Russian military) force from the Ukrainian direction and drop it in Syria is insane even for the current Russian leadership, which long ago failed all tests for sanity. So in Syria, you can use only what is there; there is no reserve of anything. In this sense, the Pindosis are doing just fine. (Explicit military) aggravation, they need only as a threat but not as an action.
However, with one clarification: (this applies only) if a Clinton victory in the elections is undeniable. Strikes on the Assad regime (remain) a necessary option if things go badly, and they need to energize the electorate with a demonstration of their power. But this will spoil the beautiful picture of the Syrian war, which, in truth, is not too desirable for Obama. For Clinton, by the way, even more so. For Clinton if she is elected, the most important foreign policy decision will be the reincarnation of the Arab Spring and its logical sequel: the march on the remaining intact Middle Eastern regimes. This requires a tool, and Daesh looks very promising in this sense. Russia, fighting with the “moderate” terrorists, keeps Daesh intact than fully ensure any plans to use Daesh in the future. Putin is just a very profitable partner for Pindostan and can only support the war against “moderates” (which) would inevitably lead Russia into a new clash with Turkey, and also make impossible any agreement with the Arabian monarchies. Daesh remains in fully operational condition. Here the Kremlin is fully consistent with long-term policy of Pindostan, and the threatening rhetoric of the past subtly creating a corridor along which Putin can move. Pindostan is perfectly able to work with the complexes and personal qualities of its opponents, provoking them and forcing (them to) advantageous solutions. Working with misery and intellectual pygmies in this case, is a pleasure. “A fool does not need a knife,” as they say. Putin’s a psychopath, apparently, and the Pindosis have studied him long and hard. It is only in Russia that he is humbly called the greatest genius and champion of geopolitical chess. For Pindosi politicians, (these are) tramps out of the doorways, not rivals. Some provocations, and work with the inflated ego of our president seems even formulaic. But the result is achieved, and therefore, everything is in order.