colonel cassad for monday

Briefly about Karabakh. 10/26/2020
Colonel Cassad, Oct 26 2020

During the night, the Azerbaijani army was able to move a little more towards the Lachin corridor. About 7km to 9 km are left to the Lachin corridor, 12 km to 14 km to Lachin itself. When consolidating in these positions, one can already count on a stable opportunity to organize a systemic fire destruction of the indicated areas, which will make it impossible for any serious traffic on this road. Last night the Azerbaijani army confirmed control over Kubatly and part of the countryside east of Khanlyk, as well as the occupation of several more villages in the Zangelan region and near the border with Iran. There’s a few more days of cleaning work here.

As it is not difficult to guess, the ceasefire announced by Trump at 8 am did not start, failing as well as the ceasefire announced in Moscow. Azerbaijan reasonably continues its attempts to seize the Lachin corridor, which could lead to disastrous consequences for the entire Armenian defense in Karabakh. Both sides, as usual, accused each other of breaking the truce.

New truce in Karabakh. Trump’s attempt
Colonel Cassad, Ocr 25 2020

A new truce has been announced tomorrow in Karabakh, to begin at 8 am local time.

The armistice agreement was reached after US talks with Armenia and Azerbaijan and Trump’s statements that he would easily deal with this problem. Prior to that, all the truces have failed for obvious reasons. Now the USA is trying to enter this clearing. There is a certain intrigue here: if the US succeeds where the Russian Federation did not succeed, and the ceasefire concluded under pressure from Washington works in practice for some time (say, 5-7 days), then this will deal a serious blow to the image of the Russian Federation’s claims to being the Transcaucasian arbitrator. Everything will be clear: the USA and the Russian Federation both tried, but only the USA succeeded. Trump will receive an additional argument to make up for other failures of his foreign policy at the finish of the US presidential election. I would say that for him Karabakh in the current reality is more of an internal political issue (especially taking into account the support of the Armenian diaspora), although it is certainly not a good idea to underestimate the US strategic plans to destabilize the Caucasus and weaken the Russian sphere of influence. But there is a problem that Russia has already faced: it is not profitable for Turkey and Azerbaijan to stop the offensive. Therefore, Washington may face the same problem: the parties nod that they agree, and the war will continue. Azerbaijan today occupied the town of Kubatly east of Khanlyk. It is not yet possible to get through to Lachin. But more about the military situation tomorrow.

The first Armenian kamikaze UAV
Colonel Cassad, Oct 25 2020

A month after the start of the war, the Armenians rolled out the announcement of their kamikaze UAV, which is being prepared for use at the front. Better late than never.

The concept is quite understandable, although it smacks of handicraft. Obviously, the quality will be worse than the Israeli ones, although most likely cheaper. There is also a question about the performance characteristics (range, load, type of ammunition etc) and Armenia’s ability to produce them in significant quantities, so that this would have an impact on what is happening at the front. Plus it is worth remembering that the very same Israeli “Harop” often operate in cooperation with the Turkish UAV “Bayraktar” and other drones in service with Azerbaijan. To copy such tactics, Armenia will still have to work out interaction with its X-55s, which did not actually interact with conventional shock drones. So, I would not count on any unprecedented successes of the Armenian kamikaze, although 2-3 successful hits will help create a propaganda picture in the media. In addition, if the Armenian experiments in this direction yield certain results, I would not rule out that Armenia will intensify negotiations on the purchase of imported kamikaze UAVs. Although, of course, this should have been done before the war. The current feverish activity of the Armenians in this direction is an attempt to urgently eliminate the critical mistakes made in the planning of military construction, for which they had to pay with blood and territory. Azerbaijan approached the issue of preparing for war, moreover, a modern war, where the role of drones increased, more thoroughly, which determined its initial successes.

Turkish F-16s at Gabala airbase
Colonel Cassad, Oct 25 2020

Another snapshot of Turkish F-16s operating in Azerbaijan. The picture was taken on October 19 at the Gabala airbase. Earlier, the Armenians stated that after the publication of satellite images of the airbase in Ganja, the Turks drove their cars to the Gabala airbase. Then they did not provide any data and they were accused of lying. Nevertheless, after about 2 weeks, Turkish cars did show up in Gabala. The author of the picture signed it “6 presumably Turkish F-16s at the Gabala air base.” However, only 4 vehicles are visible in the picture. It is not clear where this discrepancy comes from. Perhaps there are other pictures that were not posted. Until mid-October, Azerbaijan at the official level denied the presence of Turkish F-16s on its territory, but after the publication in Western media of satellite images dated Oct 3 from the airbase in Ganja, where F-16s were recorded, Aliyev after a while was forced to admit their presence, giving a new version that they were just standing there, but did not participate in hostilities. Along the way, all the Azerbaijani propaganda has done its job, which for several days, with a persistence worthy of better use, tried to prove that the satellite images of the airbase in Ganja show not F-16s, but Italian M-346s. There is one example of the “fact of checking” which was refuted the customer. However, on the agenda remains the issue of confirming the facts of combat use, which, despite the statements of the Armenian Defense Ministry, are still in question.

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