‘Leaked’ copy of 26 May IAEA Report here (pdf, 10 pp., 140 kB)
Here is the important bit, and, despite the assertion of “multiple sources,” it is in fact the same old laptop rubbish, added undeserved authority by the fact that Olli Heinonen, the IAEA DDG, signed off on it in February:
E. Possible Military Dimensions
14. In addition to the implementation of Iran’s Additional Protocol, for the Agency to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, Iran needs to, inter alia, resolve questions related to the alleged studies, provide more information on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document, clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related, and clarify the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.
15. During a meeting in Tehran on 21–22 April 2008, Iran agreed to address the alleged studies, the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies, and questions which had been raised in the Agency’s letters of 8 February and 12 February 2008. On 9 May 2008, the Agency submitted a request for additional clarifications relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran provided its response to these questions on 23 May 2008, which is being assessed by the Agency.
16. At follow up meetings in Tehran on 28–30 April and 13–14 May 2008, the Agency presented, for review by Iran, information related to the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project. This included information which Iran had declined to review in February 2008. This information, which was provided to the Agency by several Member States, appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent. The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran.
17. One aspect of the alleged studies refers to the conversion of uranium dioxide to UF4, also known as green salt. A second aspect concerns the development and testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment and exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators including, inter alia, the simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators; an underground testing arrangement, and the testing of at least one full scale hemispherical, converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device. A third aspect of the studies concerns development work alleged to have been performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead.
18. On 14 May 2008, Iran provided in writing its overall assessment of the documents presented to it by the Agency. Iran stated that the documents “do not show any indication that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been working on a nuclear weapon.” Iran also stated that the documents were not authentic, that they were “forged” or “fabricated.” Iran did not dispute that some of the information contained in the documents was factually accurate, but said the events and activities concerned involved civil or conventional military applications. Iran said the documents contained numerous inconsistencies, and many were based on publicly available information. Iran stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has not had, and shall not have any nuclear weapon program.”
19. Concerning the documents purporting to show that Iran had been working to develop an additional capability to convert uranium dioxide to UF4 (green salt), Iran said it would not have made sense to launch such a project, as it had already acquired the necessary technology for UCF.
20. Concerning the alleged work to design and build an EBW detonator and a suitable detonator firing unit, Iran acknowledged that it had conducted simultaneous testing with two to three EBW detonators with a time precision of about one microsecond. Iran said, however, that this was intended for civil and conventional military applications. Iran further stated, inter alia, that there was no evidence in the documents presented to it to link them to Iran.
21. Concerning the documents purporting to show administrative interconnections between the alleged green salt project and a project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead, Iran stated that, since some of the documents were not shown to it by the Agency, it could not make an assessment of them. Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.
22. Concerning six technical reports purportedly related to efforts to engineer a new payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle, Iran stated that the files were in electronic form and could therefore have been easily manipulated. Iran also stated, inter alia, that the documents were not complete and that the report structures varied, which raised serious doubts about their authenticity.
23. The Agency is continuing to assess the information and explanations provided by Iran. However, at this stage, Iran has not provided the Agency with all the information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to support Iran’s statements. In light of the discussion on 14 May 2008, the Agency is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of these alleged studies and which Iran should share with the Agency.
24. It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information—apart from the uranium metal document—on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon, or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies. As regards the uranium metal document found in Iran, Pakistan has confirmed, in response to the Agency’s request, that an identical document exists in Pakistan.
25. Although the Agency did not detect any nuclear activities at Kolahdouz or Parchin, the role of military related institutes, such as the Physics Research Center (PHRC), the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) and the Education Research Institute (ERI) and their staff, needs to be better understood, also in view of the fact that substantial parts of the centrifuge components were manufactured in the workshops of the Defence Industries Organization. The Agency also needs to understand fully the reasons for the involvement of military related institutions in procurement for the nuclear programme.
Niqnaq 