2001 g8 genoa summit police convicted

Italian police officers convicted of
violence at 2001 G8 Genoa Summit
Nick Squires, Daily Telegraph, Nov 14 2008

An Italian court has convicted 13 police officers of violence against antiglobalisation protesters at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, when demonstrators were beaten up, spat on and threatened with rape. After a four year trial, the court acquitted 16 other, more senior officers of the abuses, to cries of “shame, shame” from activists awaiting the verdict. The 13 convicted policemen were found guilty of inflicting violence and abusing their powers during a predawn raid on a school where protesters, including British activists, were staying in Genoa during the G8 meeting. A lengthy appeals process and a statute of limitations which annuls sentences after a given period of time mean that none of the convicted are actually likely to spend any time in prison.

Police raided the Diaz school at the end of a summit marred by massive protests, with some groups turning violent and rampaging through the city. Many of the Italian and foreign activists in the school said they were attacked while they slept and described acts of extreme brutality by Italy’s paramilitary Carabinieri. Three people were beaten unconscious and dozens had to be taken to hospital after riot police burst into the school and arrested more than 90 protesters, including British, French and German activists. Britons caught up in the violence described police indiscriminately beating people with their batons, saying the place where they were later detained was like a “field hospital in the Crimean War” full of people with broken bones. Freelance journalist Mark Covell told the BBC after the attack:

I though I was going to die. I could hear my bones breaking inside. My lung collapsed. Most of my ribs on my left hand side are smashed. My spleen is ruptured. That was just the first attack. Then the second one came in. They hit me again, just because I moved a bit. I just moved my arm, and they hit me again, sustained for about five or 10 minutes.

Images of blood plastering the walls and floors of the school sparked an outcry in Italy and abroad. At least one of the officers convicted, Michelangelo Fournier, confirmed some of the allegations, testifying that police beat up defenceless people and left the school looking like a “butcher’s shop”. He said he had kept quiet “out of shame and a spirit of comradeship” with police colleagues. Fournier, a top official in Rome, received a two-year sentence. The rest of the convicted received sentences ranging from one month to four years and were ordered to pay financial compensation to the victims. During demonstrations by antiglobalisation activists during the summit, a protester was shot dead by a carabinieri police conscript, more than 200 people were injured and 240 were detained. Many of the policemen who were on trial are still in service and some have since been promoted. Two are currently senior officers in Italy’s anti-terrorism unit and the secret service. Prosecutors had asked for much heavier sentences. […]

everybody wants to keep their jobs

Feinstein Calls for New Intelligence Leadership
Keith Perine, Tim Starks, CQ, Nov 13 2008

Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat expected to chair the Senate Intelligence Committee next year, called Thursday for new leadership for the nation’s intelligence community. “My view is that it’s time for a new start,” Feinstein said in an interview. Her call deals a blow to the prospects of Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and CIA Director Michael V. Hayden carrying over to the administration of President-elect Barack Obama. Feinstein is poised to take the gavel of the Intelligence panel from John D. Rockefeller IV , D-W.Va., who is expected to chair the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee. Both McConnell and Hayden meanwhile signaled publicly that they would like to remain in their posts under Obama. Democrats who follow the intelligence community agree that cooperation within the intelligence community has improved under Hayden, McConnell, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Pentagon intelligence chief James R. Clapper. But McConnell and Hayden have been outspoken defenders of the Bush administration’s surveillance and interrogation policies that have drawn critical fire from the same Democrats. Feinstein in particular has been critical of CIA interrogation practices she considers torture. Feinstein said:

I want to see the Senate Intelligence Committee with much closer oversight and a much closer relationship with the intelligence community.

A second Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, Russ Feingold, D-Wis., echoed Feinstein’s call for new leadership in the spy community. Feingold stated in a news release:

I am confident President-elect Obama understands the need for new leadership of the intelligence community and will appoint competent, capable people who will work aggressively to ensure the safety and security of Americans without undermining our laws and Constitution. For eight years, the current administration has shown contempt for the rule of law, including in intelligence-related matters, while repeatedly refusing to work cooperatively with Congress. At the same time, the administration has failed to develop comprehensive strategies to protect our nation against our most immediate threat, al Qaeda and its affiliates. New leadership is needed to move our intelligence policies in the right direction.

At separate events, McConnell and Hayden discussed their interest in keeping their jobs. “If asked to stay, I think both of us would seriously consider it,” Hayden said after a speech at the Atlantic Council of the United States. But he added that both he and McConnell understand they “serve at the pleasure of the president” and that it was important that there be a “personal relationship” between the president and his intelligence chiefs. Hayden offered some guidance to Obama, advising him not to worry so much about the structure of the intelligence community as picking trusted people to lead the agencies. In his speech, Hayden also cautioned Obama that while al Qaeda has suffered “serious setbacks,” the terrorist organization is adapting, and its safe haven in Pakistan’s northwest tribal areas “remains the most clear and present danger to the United States today.”

albright’s ME nuclear weapons freeze

Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the ME:
Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation
David Albright, Andrea Scheel, ISIS, Nov 12 2008 (pdf)

Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider ME over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors. Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kg by 2020 and nearly 45,000 kg by 2030. Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. ME countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the ME and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone, the US must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power. These goals are consistent with the recommendations of the WMD Commission chaired by Hans Blix. This commission called on all states in the ME to commit themselves for a prolonged period of time to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories.

Nuclear power has gained popularity in the ME due to projected power shortages in countries with growing populations. Oil producing nations also want to supplement domestic energy needs to allow for export of more oil and gas. Critics often note that oil exporting countries have little need to supplement existing energy sources with nuclear power. However, high international oil prices have led some oil exporting nations, flush with cash, to consider costly nuclear power reactors over other alternatives. The US and other NSG countries have not succeeded in addressing the threat posed by looming plutonium stockpiles in the ME. Because of growing insecurity in the ME, resulting from Iran’s nuclear progress in defiance of UNSC demands, other countries will likely start to consider their own options, perhaps including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Ensuring the absence of plutonium separation and uranium enrichment capabilities and minimizing stocks of plutonium will reduce the proliferation threat in this unstable region. The US should align its policies with the goal of reducing the risk posed by civil nuclear power programs especially in regions of tension like the ME. It should steadfastly discourage civil reprocessing of irradiated power reactor fuel both domestically and internationally. Where reprocessing already exists it should work to minimize the size of separated plutonium stockpiles. To reduce the threat of proliferation in the ME, the US should work to accomplish the following goals:

A New Norm: No Supply of Nuclear Reactors
without Additional Protocol in Force.
Suppliers of nuclear reactors should insist that a recipient country has the AP in force. This condition is especially important in the ME. An important indicator of increased risk of proliferation in the ME has been when a state does not implement the AP. Traditional safeguards are not adequate to detect countries conducting secret plutonium separation or enrichment efforts. Iraq, Iran, Syria, Algeria, and Libya evaded detection of their clandestine nuclear programs despite permitting traditional inspections by the IAEA. In the case of Libya, part of its evasion strategy was to refuse to accept the more intrusive inspections embodied in the IAEA’s AP. Without the AP and often further transparency measures in place, the IAEA cannot provide adequate assurances that a country’s nuclear energy program is purely civilian in nature. Currently, of fifteen ME countries that have expressed interest in nuclear power, fewer than half have signed or ratified the AP. Only Jordon, Turkey, Libya, and Kuwait have the AP in force; Iran, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia have signed it. Iran suspended its compliance with the AP in early 2006, in defiance of the UNSC. Despite this move, Russia has continued construction of the Bushehr reactor. Egypt announced in 2007 that it would not sign the AP, yet Russia has given no indication that it will prevent its firms from bidding to build a nuclear reactor at El Dabaa. The Obama administration should work to institutionalize the norm that the supply of a nuclear reactor requires that a state have the AP in force.

Voluntary Moratorium on Reprocessing
and Enrichment in the ME.
ME countries seeking nuclear power should agree to a moratorium on the development of reprocessing and enrichment capabilities. Egypt has rejected such a moratorium. In September 2008, Egypt’s ambassador to the US, Nabil Fahmy, rejected such a moratorium, saying, “if we’re looking at enrichment by way of a proliferation issue, then … you bring in other factors, such as what are other states doing, who has it, who does not.” The UAE has recently indicated that it may renounce acquisition of these capabilities and rely on supplier countries for both fuel provision and spent fuel repatriation. UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan stated that “the Government of the UAE has … adopted a policy renouncing the development of any domestic enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in favor of long-term arrangements for the external supply of nuclear fuel.” Such announcements are beneficial to reducing the threat of proliferation and should be encouraged as a matter of US policy.

NSG Agreement Not to Provide Reprocessing
and Enrichment Technology
The NSG should agree to refuse sales of reprocessing and enrichment technologies to countries in the ME and elsewhere where proliferation remains a concern, including to countries that have not signed the NPT. A small number of ME countries may argue that they need to purchase civil uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technologies. They can be expected to argue that such facilities would serve as a regional supplier for enriched uranium fuel for power reactors, or a regional reprocessing plant, where plutonium could be extracted for recycling spent fuel for re-use in power reactors as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Media reports said that the Turkish government is interested in obtaining an enrichment plant, though the government later denied such plans. Nonetheless, at the June 2008 NSG meeting, Turkey objected to a regional ban on the supply of uranium enrichment or reprocessing plants. Such capabilities are not necessary in the ME for nuclear power to thrive at least during the next several decades, yet would significantly increase the risk of proliferation.

Spent Fuel Take-back and Fuel Assurances
Reactor suppliers in cooperation with other NSG members and the IAEA should negotiate spent fuel take-back arrangements as well as a guaranteed fuel supply with ME countries. Russia has done so with Iran’s Bushehr reactor. Although these arrangements would leave a country with a considerable amount of plutonium-rich spent fuel, they would cap the amount of plutonium in the country and remove all of it after the reactor shuts down, preventing the emergence of ‘plutonium depots’. It is important that any take-back arrangements not be equivalent to reprocessing contracts with a supplier country, such as those that France and Britain signed years ago with Japan and several European countries. Otherwise, ME countries could obtain nuclear weapons-usable plutonium in separated form or as MOX fuel.

Verifiable Fissile Cutoff Treaty
The Obama administration should make a key priority of persuading Israel to join the negotiations of a universal, verified treaty that bans the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosives, commonly called the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). As an interim step, the US should press Israel to suspend any production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Toward this goal, the US should change its relatively new policy of seeking a cutoff treaty that does not include verification. The Bush administration’s rejection of the long-standing US policy of requiring verification was a mistake that the incoming administration needs to rectify.

Conclusion
The initiatives outlined above would establish international confidence in the peaceful nature of ME nuclear programs. These steps are vital to gaining the future support of all nations in the region for a ME zone free of nuclear weapons. An appropriate confidence building measure would include the re-creation of a multilateral negotiation forum for sustained discussion about a regional NWFZ and other pressing security issues. Because of the volatility of the ME and the high potential for nuclear proliferation, the Obama administration must take the lead in creating more effective barriers to proliferation before these nuclear reactors are constructed.

orwell wouldn’t have been startled by this

Syria and the Iranian path
Yossi Melman, Haaretz, Nov 16 2008

The discovery of enriched uranium at the Syrian military site that Israel bombed last year may be the first step toward revealing Syria’s smoking gun. This week, ElBaradei will submit a report to the organization’s Board of Governors on Syria’s nuclear program. The report will state that IAEA inspectors discovered traces of enriched uranium at the site on the bank of the Euphrates River. This will be ElBaradei’s first written report on the Syrian issue, and the first time since the bombing that a non-American, non-Israeli official has expressed suspicions that the bombed site was a nuclear reactor (you’ve read it, then? – RB). Until now, only the CIA claimed the structure was a nuclear reactor in the final stages of construction, but even it spoke cautiously, noting that radioactive material had yet to be introduced to the site. The IAEA report not only strengthens claims by the American and Israeli intelligence community, it even goes beyond them.

Since the bombing, the Syrians have made every effort to deny, confuse and conceal the nature of the site. At first they claimed Israeli planes entered their airspace but were repelled. Then they said the planes dropped a few bombs, but caused no damage. Later, Assad confirmed that the planes had bombed a military building, but denied vehemently that the location contained a nuclear reactor. North Korea, which built the facility, echoed Assad’s sentiments. Photographs released by US intelligence show clearly that the structures that survived the bombing were quickly cleared away, and vast amounts of soil were removed from the area, most likely to remove traces of radioactivity. Furthermore, Syria found various ways to block IAEA inspectors from the site (like pointing out they had no right to inspect anything – RB). In June, nine months after the bombing, Damascus finally allowed inspectors to enter. They took samples of earth, rocks, air, water and plants, and transferred them to IAEA laboratories in Austria. The results that emerged were complicated and ambiguous, and experts struggled to come to definitive conclusions.

For a while it seemed as if Syria’s efforts to hide the circumstances of the bombing were succeeding. Lately, however, experts have drawn clear results — traces of man-made uranium were identified at the site. The experts were unable to determine the precise source of the radioactive material, but have cited three options. The first is that small amounts of radioactive material entered the site during its construction, which conflicts with US intelligence‘s preliminary findings. The second option is that Syrian or foreign nuclear experts came into contact with radioactive material at their workplace and unintentionally left it behind at the facility. A final option is that equipment previously used to enrich uranium was installed at the site.

The discovery of uranium now reinforces the onus on the Assad regime, which will be forced to provide comprehensive explanations. The strange pronouncements made last week by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem – that the Israeli planes dropped bombs bearing radioactive material – can hardly be considered such an explanation. The IAEA will demand that Syria allow its officials to speak with the experts who discovered the radioactive material or equipment at the site. (? – RB) For several weeks Damascus has refused to allow additional visits from IAEA inspectors, and if it persists, suspicions will heighten that it has something to hide.

Pushing Syria into the corner is reminiscent of what happened to Iran. Tehran also denied at first that it had built hidden nuclear facilities, such as the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, the centrifuge factory in Tehran and the reactor in Arak. When the truth finally emerged, Iran was forced to admit the existence of the sites, but continued to deny that they were being used for nuclear activity. As it was confronted with ever more facts, it continued weaving its web of lies, until the IAEA finally labeled it a non-compliant country that had violated its obligations under the NPT (the one Israel won’t sign – RB), and the UNSC imposed sanctions on it. Syria is still far from that point, but the discovery of uranium at the bombed site could be a turning point. It could be the first step toward finding the smoking gun that incriminates Damascus in the international community, and strengthens Israel’s claim that its own operation was necessary and justified to prevent Syria from developing a nuclear weapon.

orwell would have been a bit startled by this

Pakistan and US Have Tacit Deal On Airstrikes
Karen DeYoung, Joby Warrick, WaPo, Nov 16 2008

The US and Pakistan reached tacit agreement in September on a don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy that allows unmanned Predator aircraft to attack suspected terrorist targets in rugged western Pakistan, according to senior officials in both countries. In recent months, the US drones have fired missiles at Pakistani soil at an average rate of once every four or five days. The officials described the deal as one in which the US government refuses to publicly acknowledge the attacks while Pakistan’s government continues to complain noisily about the politically sensitive strikes […]