The population of Idlib and the DMZ
Colonel Cassad, Sep 18 2018
Mr Gary Kasparov, I’m in Northern Lebanon, and write out these lines. Do you agree to come to LIVE here, if Assad is removed? Yes / No, please. I’m really tired of bullies who do not pay for the consequences of their actions.
– (C) Nassim Taleb, in response to accusations by Kasparov that he supports the policies of Syria and Russia in the Syrian war.
In addition to https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/4464387.html. The analysis of the real population of Idlib, including fakes, about 3 million residents, as well as the Russian-Turkish deal on the creation of a DMZ.
The population of Idlib.
1. For the record, while all seem to believe that the number of civilians in Idlib close to 3 million, a source in Damascus, who was very reliable in the past, believes the actual number may exceed 1 million.
2. It is assumed that the 3 million civilians living in Idlib. And as the pre-war housing stock and other infrastructure were able to accommodate twice as many people than in the pre-war population? In addition, it can be assumed that housing and infrastructure is now nowhere and close are not at the level of the pre-war conditions/capacity.
3. In fact, 3 in Idlib million currently, compared with 1.2-1.5 million pre-war, a construction boom is expected either (and not war) or the construction of the massive camps in which to accommodate such huge numbers. However, we do not see reliable images of such camps or investment in housing.
4. Note that the assumption that the number of people living in Idlib doubled from the pre-war level, suggests that since the war started no one left the province. It is not credible. If Idlib is now 3 million, where did the almost 7 million refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan come from? Are any of them from Idlib?
5. Despite the fact that I didn’t do mathematical calculations, those are estimates, claim that the maximum number of displaced civilians who used the buses to enter the province from other cities should not exceed 200,000 people. I wish someone proved it was wrong using objective data.
6. Even if the number of people entering the province was twice more than is listed here, and even if we make conservative assumptions about the number who left the province after the war, it is difficult to understand how the number could exceed 1 million by open figures presented above.
On the demilitarized zone.
1. Let’s move on to what, apparently, we already know by Oct 15 will be established area with a width of 9-12 miles. It will not include heavy weapons or extreme elements of the insurgency (rebels associated with AQ). The zone will be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces.
2. The first critical point is to note whether this transaction will ensure that the highway that passes through Idlib and connects the north and the south of the country passes under government control. This was one of the strategic goals of Damascus in any operation in Idlib.
3. Damascus approved the deal, providing the highway will be considered as an immediate benefit. The deal will mean a delay in the plan of the state to reclaim “every inch” of its territory. Damascus is wary of the fact that the uprising has turned into a separatist project.
4. Turning to the armed groups in the transaction indicates that the area will not include heavy weapons or HTS/Nusra, but all other armed groups can stay. What we will likely see is a wholesale change of image, rebranding HTS/Nusra to become Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, etc.
5. There are various scenarios: A) Turkey has effective control over HTS/Nusra and therefore the ability to withdraw them from the new zone. B) the group agrees to obey, but rebrands itself and stays. C) Turkey will not be able to fulfill its end of the bargain and HTS/Nusra will remain as it is.
6. Regardless of whether HTS/Nusra disappears just visually or for real, this transaction is based on the assumption that all armed forces will carry out their part of the bargain and adhere to the requirements of Turkey to cease all military operations against the Syrian state from this area.
7. When it comes to Turkey, there is no doubt that Erdogan was able to delay/prevent a military operation in Idlib for the moment. But now he has to make the Idlib train arrive by the time scheduled at the final station. The behaviour of the armed groups in the province now explicitly depends on Ankara.
8. As for Russia, its own military will now officially patrol one area with a NATO member. Putin is patient and will see that this transaction will exacerbate divisions within NATO. All he had to pay for it, is to promise a delay in any military operations in Idlib.
9. Pindostan, of course, is absent in today’s agreement, but nevertheless Faschingstein ascribes to itself the merits of preventing the attack on Idlib by means of pressure on Russia. In fact, Moscow and Ankara are now the leading foreign capitals in the matter of Idlib.
10. Like most of the previous “deals” in Syria, time will tell whether this agreement “demilitarized zones” different from those who preceded it. It’s an obvious assumption in this agreement that Erdoğan will be able to control all these armed people gathered in the province.
11. At the moment, Erdogan has strengthened his legendary status in the Syrian opposition. He personally voted to prevent military strikes against the province, and it will add points to his very high popularity in most opposition.
The status of the Syrian opposition.
1. So far most of the comments regarded the deal as a win for the opposition, as they avoided the danger of an impending attack on the province. But is this deal really is positive for the opposition? Answer: No.
2. Go back to the beginning. This opposition was formed to overthrow the government. The diplomatic language of the Geneva process, called it “political transition,” Nothing less than this was considered acceptable in relation to the government. As of yesterday, time easy avoiding the immediate impact is now seen as a victory.
3. Let’s not forget that from the first days of talks on political transition in Geneva, the only political activity that remained was to attempt to establish a Constitutional Committee. Everything else was postponed. Now that we’ve established the overall status of the opposition, let’s discuss this deal.
4. In fact, this new deal greatly restricts the ability of armed groups to attack the Syrian government. Practically this is no different from any previous transaction freeze/reconciliation. The only difference is that Turkey made a deal with the Russians on their behalf.
5. This transaction creates the preconditions for the elimination of the most fierce fighters within the armed groups. The definition of terrorism will come from the Turkish security services, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. And now Turkey is obliged to remove “terrorists and all heavy weapons” by Nov 10.
6. But the fact that they lost the opposition also lies in the fact that she will be forced to relinquish control over the key highway, which was inaccessible to the Syrian state. Indeed, access to motorways M4 & M5 was one of the strategic objectives of the operation in Idlib. Now the state has received such access, even without a firefight.
7. The armed men inside Idlib will now have to find a goal that is distinct from attacks on the positions of the state or the army. Under this deal, in all likelihood, anti-air defense puts the opposition in even more severe conditions than before the announcement of the transaction.
EHSANI22, the original in English. I recommend to follow the author. This is his second account. He writes about Syria from the end of “zero,” when the war was not yet.
In addition.
1. At the request of Russia, Turkey will increase its contingent, which will focus on addressing the issue of “An-Nusra”.
2. Turkey will attract a large number of UAVs to monitor the actions of the groups raises problems for the implementation of the agreement.
3. Nebenzia in the UNSC said that the plans of the CW provocation of her customers refused and she still could happen, as gas cylinders and personnel who have to apply them are still in Idlib.
An important addition is part of the groups has refused to withdraw from the zone de-escalate and disarm. Among the refused are HTS/Nusra, the Islamic Party of Turkestan, Jaish al-Issa and others. Fighters ready to resist as the SAA and those who come to disarm them, to put an end to the “Syrian revolution.” Erdogan will have to solve this problem in the very near future, as the lack of progress in creating areas of deescalation will actually bury the transaction at the beginning, then Damascus will carry out its offensive, referring to the fact that the Turkish option was tried and didn’t work.
Niqnaq 